Texas Supreme Court Takes Up Important Issues in Same-Sex Harassment Case
Currently pending before the Texas Supreme Court is a case
involving three important issues for Texas employers, both public and
private. First, to invoke the TCHRA’s
waiver of governmental immunity, must a plaintiff establish but-for causation
found in the third step of the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework? Second, what kind of evidence can establish
that same-sex harassment was not just about gender, but because of
gender? And third, must a supervisor
actually exercise hiring and firing authority under the United States Supreme
Court’s standard in Vance v. Ball State
Univ. for the purpose of establishing vicarious liability?
In Alamo Heights Ind.
Sch. Dist. v. Clark, No. 16-0244, Clark, a female physical education teacher and coach,
claimed she was sexually harassed by her female supervisor and a co-worker, and
fired in retaliation for her complaints.
In the trial court below, the school district filed a plea to the
jurisdiction, which the trial court denied, and then appealed the denial to the
Fourth Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court’s ruling. The Texas Supreme Court recently agreed to
hear the case.
Both sides weave vastly different stories in their
briefing. The school district claims that
the trial court and the Fourth Court of Appeals erred, and should have: (1)
required Clark to prove but-for causation to survive the plea to the
jurisdiction; (2) determined that Clark was unable to prove her sex harassment
claim because the harassment was about gender, but not based on gender; and (3)
found that Clark’s “supervisor” was not a “supervisor” in accordance with the Vance standard.
In turn, Clark: (1) disputes that she is required to prove but-for
causation to survive the plea to the jurisdiction, and instead claims she must
only establish a prima facie case; (2)
claims that the evidence, which includes lewd comments and touching,
establishes that the harassment was based on sex; and (3) contends that one of
the harassers was a de facto
supervisor under Vance, and was also a “supervisor” for other
reasons.
If the school district is right about the jurisdictional
issue, plaintiffs seeking a waiver of sovereign immunity under the TCHRA will
face a high burden early in the litigation when challenged by a plea to the
jurisdiction. If Clark is right about
her same-sex harassment claim, then the Court could arguably, expressly or
implicitly, expand the evidentiary routes for a plaintiff to establish
harassment because of gender. And finally, the Court’s decision about the
scope of authority required to establish “supervisor” status, if reached, could
either expand or contract the pool of individuals who can subject an employer to
vicarious liability.
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