The Dallas Hospitality Employment Lawyer Blog

In its ExxonMobil Corporation and WHM Custom Services Inc. v. Rincones decision issued last week, the Texas Supreme Court held that there is no independent cause of action in Texas for compelled self-defamation.  http://www.txcourts.gov/supreme/orders-opinions/2017/may/may-26-2017/ .   The crux of this sometimes-recognized tort is that a former employee's publication to a third party can satisfy the publication element of a defamation claim because the former employee is effectively compelled to publish the defamatory statement to prospective employers when the employee is asked why she left her former employment.  The claim often arose in cases where an employee alleged that the employer gave a false reason for the employee's discharge, and the employee was "compelled" to publish the false statement to prospective new employers during the hiring process.  Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, several appeals courts in Texas had recognized the theory. In

Pundits proclaimed that with the new administration, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) would dial down or pull back from its current position of DEFCON 2 with respect to employer handbook policies.  As evidenced by a decision issued by an Administrative Law Judge last week, it does not appear that a retreat is in sight.   In Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. and United Government Security Officers of America, Local 25 , Case Nos. 01-CA-153956, 01-CA-158947, and 01-CA-165432 (May 12, 2017), the ALJ found that the following handbook policies violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), even though most of them were not actually at issue in the case:   1.  Integrity Code (communications):  employees should not engage in communications that "include material that is inappropriate, untrue, or disparaging to outside parties or to [employer]."  According to the ALJ, the NLRB has repeatedly held that such a prohibition is unlawful because it restricts employees i

Currently pending before the Texas Supreme Court is a case involving three important issues for Texas employers, both public and private.   First, to invoke the TCHRA’s waiver of governmental immunity, must a plaintiff establish but-for causation found in the third step of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework? Second, what kind of evidence can establish that same-sex harassment was not just about gender, but because of gender?   And third, must a supervisor actually exercise hiring and firing authority under the United States Supreme Court’s standard in Vance v. Ball State Univ . for the purpose of establishing vicarious liability?   In Alamo Heights Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Clark , No. 16-0244, Clark, a female physical education teacher and coach, claimed she was sexually harassed by her female supervisor and a co-worker, and fired in retaliation for her complaints.   In the trial court below, the school district filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denie