11th Circuit Panel Parses Gender Stereotyping and Sexual Orientation Claims
Last week, a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of a plaintiff’s Title VII sexual
orientation claim, but vacated the district court’s order dismissing the
employee’s gender non-conformity claim, drawing both an interesting concurring opinion
and a no-holds-barred, partial dissent. See Evans v. Georgia Regional Hosp., et al.,
No. 15-15234 (11th Cir. March 10, 2017).
In Evans, the initially pro se
plaintiff, a lesbian hospital security officer, claimed, among other things,
that she was discriminated against for failing to conform to gender stereotypes
and because of her sexual orientation. A
magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the claims because Title VII was not
intended to cover discrimination against homosexuals, and further because the
gender non-conformity claim was “just another way to claim discrimination based
on sexual orientation.” The district
court conducted a de novo review of
the record and adopted, without further comment, the magistrate’s
recommendations.
On appeal, a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit, relying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936,
938 (5th Cir. 1979), affirmed dismissal of the sexual orientation claim
because, as the Blum Court found,
discharge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII. Drawing a line between sexual orientation and
sex stereotyping, the Court reversed and remanded the gender non-conformity
claim, finding that a gender non-conformity claim is not just another way to
claim discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In a concurring
opinion, Judge Pryor agreed with the majority’s opinion, but drew a different
line between discrimination based on behavior, and discrimination based on
status. According to Judge Pryor, the
former is protected, but the latter is not, because Congress has not made
sexual orientation a protected class.
In a partial dissent,
Judge Rosenbaum argued that when a woman alleges that she has been discriminated
against because she is a lesbian, she necessarily alleges that she has been discriminated
against because she failed to conform to the employer’s image of what women
should be, and it is “utter fiction” to suggest that she was not discriminated
against for failing to comport with her employer’s stereotyped view of women. This,
says Judge Rosenbaum, is discrimination “because of sex.”
This decision highlights the ongoing struggles in
the courts about the breadth of Title VII’s protections, and once again begs
the question of which branch of government, if any, will provide a definitive
answer.
Comments
Post a Comment